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As widely observed by scholars, a marked change in the interaction between
military and society in Turkey took place during the 1997 February 28 Process, which
differed drastically from the military’s behavior toward society during earlier interventions
and attempts from 1960 to 1980. A prime factor in this change seems to be the advent of
commercial media, leading to important changes in information control, greater oversight
from society on the actions of state and military elites, and the internalization of consumerism
among Turkish citizens, the results of which extend even to the foundational assumptions
underlying the Ergenekon indictments, which address allegedly subversive activities
spanning from 2003 to 2008.
 
Former president (and prime minister on multiple occasions) Süleyman Demirel has
been attributed with saying that “God first created the Turkish army, then he real-





quip, offered by the seasoned politician shortly after he was ousted from his
premiership in the 1980 coup, points to the traditional dominance the military has
had within the Turkish polity. Though exaggerated sentiment, if one examines the
nature of the Turkish polity as an arena filled with various actors, since the passing
of the hero and founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the military makes
a persuasive case for being the most dominant. During the earlier times of crisis in
1960, 1971, and 1980, they directly intervened in the political sphere under the
auspices of restoring order and protecting the founding principles of the Turkish
Republic. In each case and within a relatively short amount of time they returned to




 In addition to these events, prior to
1971 there were also a number of instances in which juntas (led by junior officers)
attempted to appropriate the reins of power but ultimately failed.
In each of these earlier attempts, whether failed or successful, though the actions
were instigated by conditions ultimately existing within society at large, the signifi-
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political elites. Society as a whole seemed to be understood as a spectator, observing
the spectacle from the sidelines. In the course of events, the public seemed to be
perceived as an “afterthought”—not insignificant in meaning and existence but in
the context of being an active agent involved in the event. As Metin Heper points
out, the military always showed concern for legitimizing their decision to intervene









 In other words, non-political elite society was not understood as a
potential actor in the events; instead, the military consistently behaved in a pattern
that seemed to reflect an understanding of society as a spectator that could be
convinced by legitimization and the tools of control at their disposal following the
intervention.
By spring 1997, however, the rules and the understanding of the arena and the
actors within it had changed. When the Refahyol government, a coalition govern-
ment combining the center-right True Path Party (Do
 
[gbrev] ru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), was finally pushed from power, the effective
thrust consisted of an organic construction of the military and various sectors of
civil society working in tandem. It suddenly appeared that the military found it
necessary to utilize “society as actor” to gain legitimacy and to assist in the realiza-
tion of their goals. A perusal of more recent events seems to show that this new,
more interactive role for non-political elite civilian elements has become an
accepted necessity. For instance, even the assumptions underlying the Ergenekon
indictments, in which retired and active military personnel along with elements
from the media and civil society have been accused of plotting to intervene to oust
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) from power,
help to further this claim.
While scholars of Turkish politics and civil-military relations have addressed the
observation of this clear change of interaction in different ways, the focus seems to
have been on observing the transformation rather than explaining it. Nil Satana, for
example, argues that, beginning from 1990, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are
transforming into a “postmodern military” but does not clarify what it was that




 Haldun Gülalp asserts





 Such examples, and there are many others, give evidence of a change, but a
mere relegating of the enormous and quickly-altering structural changes to the
world of “postmodernism” seems inadequate. There is no consensus on the actual
substance of “postmodernism”—is it an attitude, a way of life, a system of social
structures, a description, an active agent?—and, in any case, there must be factors
underlying its genesis.
What could account for the distinct “postmodern” change between the coup of
September 12, 1980, and the February 28 process in 1997? In fact, if one turns to the
legal foundations or constitutionally-mandated institutions for a possible resolution
to this question, the problem is exacerbated. The 1982 Constitution, constructed by
the military regime after the 1980 coup, gave the military broader powers through
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of individuals and civil society in comparison to the 1961 Constitution. Though
some aspects of the curbing of rights and the increased powers of the MGK have
been subsequently amended, most of these changes occurred after the events of
1997; therefore, such changes do not explain the timing of the altered interaction of
the military with society, nor does the curbing of civil society’s rights seem to
logically correspond to a more mobilized and active civil society.
This article argues that a significant factor contributing to the change in approach
of the military toward society can be traced to the introduction of commercial (i.e.
private) media in Turkey—the product and effective agent of consumerism—and
the subsequent structural changes it brought to society, forcing the TAF to adjust
how it related to society, particularly apparent in times of crisis and intervention.
When media broadcasting to the Turkish masses went from being state-controlled
and monolithic to privately run and pluralistic, it transitioned from a tool of the state
or military (when necessary) to inform and convey to a contested arena in which
they became one voice that had to compete with others for social consent. Its advent
also became a prime catalyst for a new type of citizen, one that was increasingly
aware of her/his role as consumer—one who is provided with and actively makes
choices and takes ownership of various objects. This change facilitated a need for a
new approach in the pattern of interaction between the military and citizen consum-
ers, necessitating, in times of perceived crisis, a courting of society and civil groups
in order to both legitimate the “crisis” and elicit assistance or approval to intervene.
To this end, the emergence of commercial media (particularly television) in
Turkey and the changes it wrought—especially to the understanding, scope, and
“agents” of intervention—will be discussed below. In presenting this argument, the
article does not intend to completely discount other important factors that also may
have influenced this trajectory in civil-military relations. Economics, for example,
has not had an insignificant effect on the relations between the TAF and society as a
whole, especially since 1980. According to some scholars, the founding of OYAK
(Ordu Yardımla
 
[scedil]ma Kurumu, Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund) in 1961, an





 has come to play an increasingly important role in civil-military
relations as the fund has grown. Linda Michaud-Emin argues that OYAK is one of




 because of its size, special
benefits, and impressive portfolio. However, what she has failed to recognize is that
such forms of financial power can also be a significantly constraining force as the
power that is acquired through markets is also dependent on those markets; thus, the
perceptions and whims of others, both national and transnational, have an increas-
ingly potent effect on one’s fortunes, leading to greater constraint in one’s actions
rather than greater flexibility.
Therefore, while it might be argued to have a moderating effect on the intensity of
interventions, it would not necessarily affect the interaction structure of the inter-
ventions that have taken place. A quick review of the financial history of OYAK
unearths further incongruence in this argument. William Hale notes that in 1972








































 demonstrates a significant
amount of relative economic power even at such an early date. In other words, if




 of military-society rela-
tions in times of perceived crisis, these features should have been observable in
1971 and certainly in 1980. In reality, however, though there seems to be an aware-
ness of economic factors in all the coup attempts, the pattern of interaction between
soldiers and civilians did not noticeably change with OYAK’s growth. Therefore,
though it might have made the military increasingly reluctant to intervene, when
they did choose to intervene it did not seem to change the pattern of interaction.
Even if one maintains that economic considerations wrought changes not imme-
diately obvious in terms of behavioral change, the critical changes introduced by
commercialized media most likely heightened those considerations determining the
behavior of the military in relation to society as a whole. The continued rise of the
economy as a potent factor itself is potentially based on technological advances in
mass communication and media and their increasing availability and accessibility to
wider and wider audiences. In other words, the constraints in behavior that might
come into play as one’s economic portfolio grows would realize their potency in the
context of a ubiquitous and commercialized media. Such media, and in particular
commercial television, as it is the most widespread in usage throughout the country
and therefore a primary manifestation of this reality, will be the object of emphasis
throughout.
Furthermore, that commercial television would alter the relationship between the
military and society is not an observation unique to the Turkish context. Udi Lebel
also argues that privatization of the media (also in the early 1990s) in Israel led to
the growth of civil society movements against the Israeli military. Prior to the
commercialization of the media, military sovereignty greatly constrained the devel-
opment of civil society. With the emergence of private media, Lebel claims that
new environment opened the door for military confrontation with the new social




 Later, he states, private television’s “reports about
questionable military operations and failures revised the relationship pattern




 Although the Israeli military’s ability
and strategy in dealing with the “revision” of their relationship with society has been
different, it points out the significant impact of the introduction of commercial
media within another context, further supporting that the consideration of its
potential structural changes in Turkey is merited.
 
The Advent of Commercial Television
 
In the 1970s, a small, subtle, yet drastic revolution was occurring in the heart of
Turkish society with the advent of television. As far as the dissemination of infor-





global events were selected and disseminated to the public through the medium of
newspapers in the Ottoman Empire. Although these publications, to the extent
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impact on a very narrow audience—mostly bureaucrats—and had very minor
transformative power on the vast majority of society. Starting in the 1930s, with the




 the door was open to
reach an ever-wider Turkish audience. As the radio was state-controlled and





 this form of media acted to reinforce unified understandings and experi-
ences across the nation that could easily be formed and manipulated by those
transmitting the messages.
In the 1970s, an entirely new fascination was generated at the arrival of television






The entire gamut of social interactions between families changed for a while in
the early 1970s. Those who owned the new status symbols suddenly discovered
that they, or rather their TV sets, constituted a great attraction. Relatives,
friends, and neighbors, who they had not had very close interactions, suddenly




This drastic change in social norms, although observable on a smaller scale with




 represented a force much more potent as a catalyst for change
due to its greater social desirability. In other words, although newspapers offered a
much earlier opportunity for varying viewpoints to be communicated, people did
not rush to their neighbors’ or long-lost relatives’ houses in the evening to read or
have the newspaper read to them.
Sheer numbers help to emphasize this point. Whereas newspapers offer a total
circulation of a few million (3.5 to 4), there were 7.2 million TV sets in operation in




 with those numbers continually growing. A national
consumption survey in 1991 found that 60 percent of Turkish households owned














 As the significant impact of television could be





drastic changes in the media and the enthusiasm it generated among the public
occurred exactly during the period that societal-military relations started to change.
The initial enthusiasm generated by the entrance of television to Turkish society
occurred under strict state control. Television and radio were administered through
the Turkish Television and Radio Authority (TRT). Although it provided various
forms of officially sanctioned programming, it also functioned as a centralized force
for “the creation of national unity, through homogenized official Turkish language,





 Those millions tuning into this new technological development would
receive the same news, transmitted to them with the same understanding, packaged
neatly within the ideology sanctioned by the state. Although TRT was officially a






































it was never autonomous from close supervision from above, and after the 1980
coup, with the establishment of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo




 state-controlled media was even more
carefully monitored by military oversight. Military representatives were appointed





By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ability to monopolize control of the
airwaves turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. Starting with the broadcast




, unauthorized private stations began broad-




 Seeing the success of the pioneer-
ing examples, others followed suit, rapidly increasing the numbers of channels




 Not only that, these privately run stations were
broadcasting with no oversight by the state. When the government decided to act to
prevent the uncontrolled influx of stations, the people’s thirst for the greater range
of selection on the airwaves brought state and society into collision. Binnaz Toprak
writes: “The decision met with millions of protestors who took to the streets, honk-
ing their automobile horns, demanding ‘their’ television and radio channels back on




The political conditions in which the Constitution was amended to allow private
television and radio further emphasize its profound importance in society. As noted
by Özbudun, the governing coalition had put together a list of 13 constitutional arti-
cles on which there was mutual agreement regarding amendment, but the death of
President Özal, the parliamentary election process of President Demirel, and the
1994 local elections caused the discussions of amending the Constitution to be
temporarily shelved. Only one of these articles was passed in 1993 and accorded
“special urgency.” So while articles entailing the restrictions of fundamental rights
and liberties (13), freedom of expression (26), freedom of the press (28), freedom of
assembly (34), and others were held back from discussion until 1995, Article 133—
regarding television and radio broadcasts—was rushed through the amendment




How much did this really change? Why would this lead to a significant adjust-
ment in civil-military interaction? Especially if the military representation on the
board of RTÜK overseeing the programming of all channels broadcasting in Turkey




 why would the existence of new commer-
cial television stations make a critical difference? First, commercialized media
decentralized the information source. Information was fractionalized and could no
longer be communicated easily in a uniform way across society. Second, although
control and oversight could be maintained, it could no longer be done so absolutely
or discreetly. In other words, once numerous stations were broadcasting incessantly,
it produced the nearly inevitable situation of oversight of the overseers. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the vast variety (both in content and ideology) of infor-
mation transmitted produced a situation where citizens were suddenly and consis-
tently empowered to make choices and take ownership of the information they
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aware of itself as a consumer, led to power-seeking actors realizing that they must
“market” their perspective and agenda in order to gain consent.
 
The Effect of Fractionalization and Oversight
 
With commercial media the centralized and shared nature of information provided
from a monolithic source was lost; therefore, the previous ability to easily control
public understanding of “reality” and through this effectively control the public
during times of intervention was no longer possible. The power of a controlled and
centralized media source was observed immediately by the military with the first
intervention of 1960. Nuran Yıldız writes that one of the first determinations after





 Satana also writes that after this first intervention the radio was “heavily




 This control over a widely spread
centralized force was particularly effective during periods of successful and
attempted interventions.
The failed attempt to take over the government by former Colonel Talat Aydemir
on May 21, 1963, helps to illustrate the power of a centralized media source during
an intervention. With only a few tank battalions and the students at the Military
Academy under his command, Aydemir seemed to have placed a great deal of the
bravado for his intervention on controlling the Ankara radio station. To achieve this
end, he dispatched a few tank crews, who managed to storm the entrance of the
radio station in Ankara before transmission was cut for the night. The night reporter,
frightened beyond usefulness to broadcast a stern message, left the announcement in









Attention … You will now listen to an announcement from the Turkish Armed
Forces Intervention Central Headquarters … Great Turkish Nation … the
Turkish Armed Forces have been obliged to take control … The National
Assembly and Senate have been dissolved. All political parties and associa-





, wait in peace of mind and security for further information to be
provided to you from time to time from the Armed Forces which are fully at
your command and in your service.





Ultimately, the drama ended unsuccessfully for Aydemir, as Lieutenant Colonel Ali
Elverdi, listening to the broadcast at home, had the presence of mind to jump into
his jeep and head directly to the radio station. According to Hale: “Singlehandedly,




 and broadcast several announcements telling the
listeners to ignore Aydemir’s earlier proclamation and assuring them that the








































Aydemir’s forces were able to recover their composure, take the Lieutenant Colonel
captive, and reinstate the previous message, but for all practical purposes, the
damage was done. In the end, the General Staff cut the lines from Etimesgut, a
suburb of Ankara, and rebroadcast a message that all was once again under control









The event highlights a number of key points. With a centralized media source a
message can be broadcast to a large audience that has no other means to challenge
the truth of the “reality” being conveyed and so behave according to the message
received. Until Elverdi took over the station, the vast majority of listeners were
under the impression that the coup had already occurred. Reflecting on the events
above, former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who at the time was Minister of
Employment, remembers telling his wife to pack a suitcase with clothes, food, and a





 Such effective control over information and interpretations by the receiv-
ing audience could not be attained in a commercial media context, giving its holders
powerful control over public behavior when necessary.
The message itself also demonstrates that the idea of society as an actor in inter-
vention had not entered Aydemir’s mind. In the message, he was using an initiation




) to try to rouse other military elements
to his cause. His primary understanding of the power of the radio shows an interpre-





 To the extent that he was addressing the public his intent was to keep them
on the sidelines and to remain in their homes and wait for further information.
According to the text of the announcement provided by Birand et al, the message





 With complete and effective control over the lines of communication, there
was no need to mobilize a public that might even take positions against him; thus, it
was better that they stay on the sidelines.
Even during the 1980 coup, a central, monolithic “reality” was able to be main-
tained, but this time over both television and radio. Most Turkish citizens living at
the time have identical shared images of Chief of the General Staff (who later




For events after the commercialization of television in the early 1990s, on the other
hand, the public, though sharing the memory of the same event, would have a differ-
ent image in their mind transmitted from a potentially wide variety of perspectives.
Ultimately, as the number of stations multiplied, any direct broadcasting would
reach smaller numbers of people. Control of information within one station is rela-
tively easy; the control of information and, perhaps more importantly, its accompa-
nying interpretations, across numerous stations would require increasingly
draconian measures. Direct communication with the people was suddenly fractured
in the early 1990s and, from then on, in every instance where the military desired
such communication, they had the reality of simultaneously competing with other































Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey
 
225
An additional factor influencing the behavior of the military after the advent of
commercial television is that it created an environment where much less could be
hidden from view, enhancing public oversight. During the period of state-run
media, it was much easier to regulate and control information from “behind the
curtain.” In a centralized state-controlled context, if actions were taken to restrict,
constrain, or punish the media outlet, there was no one else to report that it
occurred. With ubiquitous media, the act of restricting or punishing sources
suddenly was forced out into the open and observed. Even when those other chan-
nels observing the relation of another media source or channel could not openly
criticize the actions they could at least observe and inform the public that actions
were being taken.
This new dilemma has been observed by a number of scholars. Toprak claims that
“[f]ollowing these improvements in communication channels, it was increasingly




This consequence would also be true for the military at times when they desired to
appropriate the means of communication with the public, heralding a change from
the past. For example, prior to commercialized media in the 1980s, the public paid
little attention to what was occurring in the southeast “because of strict media and




 Contrast this with
Cizre and Çınar’s claim that the military’s response to inquisitive external parties in
regard to actions in the southeast has moved from outright denial of actions in the




Undoubtedly, the omnipresent media has a strong hand in decreasing the possibility
of denial, forcing a search for justification. Legitimacy in the eyes of the public
could no longer be achieved simply by controlling information, which increasingly
approached impossibility; commercialized media changed society’s understanding
and awareness of itself, necessitating a new approach, the solution to which was also
provided by the agent of change itself.
 
Citizen-Consumer and Need for Consent
 
The changes that took place when commercialized media entered society did not
only alter the logistics of communication and information dissemination; they were
an effective catalyst for the “consumerization” of Turkish society. Consumerism in
society exploded with the movement toward the market economy during the Turgut
Özal years in the 1980s, but private television and the selection it brought was argu-
ably the tool that most profoundly led to its internalization by the masses. Consump-
tion and choice suddenly entered the intimate domain of the home and allowed the
citizen in convenient and private fashion to choose and consume on a perpetual
basis. This provided a feeling of ownership and choice that was increasingly unhin-
dered as the options multiplied. Toprak’s account of the public reaction to the initial
blocking of private stations by the government in which millions of people “took to








































when their “rights” as consumer were challenged, and they demonstrated the under-
standing that the channels and choices were “theirs.”
For those seeking to guide society and establish or maintain their worldview, the
increasing awareness of citizens as consumers changed the rules of the game and
created the need to compete in order to acquire consent. Toprak recounts a television
comedy sketch introduced after the introduction of private television in which a
general announces he is taking over the government only to find out that other gener-




 This cleverly points
out the new dilemma for those who want to exert control over society; suddenly,
they are constantly struggling with others with competing visions for society,
leaving the “consumers” of those visions to decide. Legitimacy comes from gather-
ing consent for one’s desired views and actions, and consent is obtained through
mastering the tools of the new social power, the media. Nuran Yıldız, reflecting on
Gramsci, writes: 
In the modern state, the source of obedience, submission, and acceptance
comes not from the creation of fear produced by violence and force, but
through consent that comes from persuasion. And this consent is produced




Thus, the arena of contestation opened up by commercial media also becomes the
primary mode through which one attains “consent” of the people, who are increas-
ingly understood as consumers with choices.
Other elements of society that desired to gather public consent quickly recognized
the opportunity created by the advent of private television. One of the key “winners”
of consent within the new environment was the RP and the emergence of a modern
religious discourse. As Öncü points out, the introduction of private channels enabled
the RP to recreate themselves in the eyes of the public through a stereotype-breaking
media campaign in 1991, presenting themselves as a party that was modern,





 During the period of state-controlled media, religion was not
given space to construct itself in these ways; on the contrary, it was basically




therefore, they presented a new and significant challenge to military and state elites.
There is fairly strong evidence that this induction of religion as a possible
choice among the new options available with private television paid dividends for
the Welfare Party. The RP suddenly became successful in the big cities in the
1990s. In the 1994 local elections, they won the mayoral seats in the two largest





 The fact that in the 1990s the RP’s vote both continually increased, and
increased in demographic areas that had previously garnered low percentages of
support, should cause one to search for an explanation. Their popularity among the
migrant urban poor in itself could not explain the change in this context, as the
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explanation is found in the proliferation and privatization of the media during this
time. The RP’s (and its predecessors’) historical support, which had been grounded
in the rural population (where the influence of media was slower to develop),
suddenly increased greatly in the urban areas where access to the media was much
more readily available.
The gains made by the RP in the 1990s led the military to enter the realm of the
media in a similar fashion to counteract the success of the Islamists. Tanel Demirel
points out: “The Turkish army especially after the late 1980s intensified its public




 He goes on to cite examples of this such
as inviting journalists to military schools and facilities and informing journalists of




 Cizre also notes:
“The military has been very successful in establishing a new relationship with




 When the military finally decided to intervene against
the RP on February 28, 1997, their interaction with society demonstrated the exist-
ence of new realities, leading them to approach the public as consumers from whom
consent was necessary for action.
Prior to, during, and following the intervention process the military exploited the
power of the media to gain consent and to mobilize the consumers to take ownership
of their shared worldview. This phenomenon was observed by numerous scholars.
To provide just a few examples, Quinn Mecham notes: “For several months the
military continued to issue threats against the government, mobilizing civil society




 Heper also tells us that the TAF “put pres-
sure on the government by giving several briefings to the members of such state and





 Furthermore, and perhaps most revealing, Cizre and Çınar
argue that the military intended to create its own channels of support “by acting like




 The authors go on to explain why
this shift has occurred: 
A major element of rupture with the past is the way the military’s priority has
shifted from invoking societal indifference and fear to producing consent and
support. In trying to undermine the RP’s popular appeal … it has appealed
directly to the organized groups of the modernized urban-secular sectors—the
business world, media, academia, public prosecutors, judges, leaders of civil
societal associations—and even held briefing meetings with them to warn them




The military was prompted to action in response to the popular appeal garnered by
the RP, which itself came through the expansion and privatization of the media.
Addressing the Islamic threat led to a change of behavior, from “invoking societal




 This demonstrates a new
significance to the role of the public; instead of being left on the sidelines, they
ultimately were encouraged to enter the “arena of contestation,” legitimizing the



































As the military’s approach toward the public during the course of interventions
changed, it also blurred the fine lines that previously existed between civil mobiliza-
tion and the mobilization of the Armed Forces. Shortly after the 1997 process,
Nilüfer Narlı points out that “military officers in uniform held hands with civilians
in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir on October 25, 1998, symbolically manifesting the




 Not only during the intervention but also
after, the military worked to “market” itself through events that put citizens in the
role of consumers. This is also well-documented by Esra Özyürek, who argues that
the state elites and military approached the celebrations surrounding the seventy-
fifth anniversary of the Republic in 1998 in a completely new fashion, establishing
society as consumers who should ultimately “take ownership of the Republic” and




These events demonstrate a change in the structural interaction between the
Armed Forces and society, changes that took place in a short amount of time and
need to be explained. The general public’s entrance into the “arena of intervention”
shows that the military no longer chose to approach them with the “old methods”
even during times of crisis. As this change has widely been observed to have taken
place during the period exactly coinciding with the rapid development of commer-
cialized media it seems logical to search there. Commercial media is not the only or
first product of consumerism in Turkey, but it was arguably the strongest catalyst in
the creation of citizen consumers. It was this change within society that forced an
alteration in the military’s approach, leading them to “market” themselves and their
worldview to generate consent and to mobilize the public. Although they exten-
sively used the media during the intervention, this is not the primary evidence, as





used it, the manner in which they presented themselves and their agenda to the
public that changed and conformed to a society that had internalized the “consumer”
worldview.
 
The Events Surrounding the Ergenekon Indictments
 
As time has passed from the February 28 process and its immediate aftermath, the
evidence has strongly pointed in favor of the assessment that the pattern of interac-
tion observed in the 1997 intervention, argued to be connected to the developments
brought by commercial media, was not isolated to a specific context but continues to
the present. Although the process began earlier in the year, on July 1, 2008, a shock-
wave passed over Turkish society as a retired force commander of the gendarmerie
and two retired commanders of army divisions were taken into custody along with




 and questioned in regard to what




 Much of the shock derived
from the fact that civilian authorities were actively pursuing cases against high-level
retired officers, who were taken into custody by police entering military quarters,
whose houses were thoroughly searched, and who would be tried in civilian courts
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the press) to maintain restraint and common sense, chose largely to remain silent.
The premise behind the indictment is that junior active elements (and former
elements) of the Armed Forces formed a group (
 
çete) with elements from civil soci-
ety to depose the ruling AKP by creating an environment that would lead to wide
social support and consent for an intervention. The claims, stemming from supposed
leaked documents, argue that the group planned to create chaos by assassinating
journalists and intellectuals and by mobilizing civil society to protest the govern-
ment, thus creating legitimacy for an intervention.62 Connections to this case were
also made with events that came out of an alleged diary of the retired Admiral of the
Naval forces, Özden Örnek, accessed by a weekly magazine, Nokta, in 2006 that
describes two attempted interventions in 2003 and 2004 before generals taken into
custody, like [Scedil] ener Eruygur, entered retirement.63 Although consistently denying
the authenticity of the diary, former Admiral Örnek has subsequently dropped his
case against the editor of Nokta.64 Though one might never know with certainty
exactly what transpired, other documents have been recovered from other suspects
that seem to confirm the broad outline of the diary’s account.65
 Although the events sent waves of concern through many segments of society,
the unique developments led the editor-in-chief of the daily Radikal, [Idot  ] smet Berkan,
to claim: “Whatever may come from the Ergenekon court cases, the investigation
itself has even raised the current democratic standards. We have experienced
another silent revolution.”66 With the passage of time, however, some of the enthu-
siasm engendered by the occasion of civilian authorities holding military personnel
accountable for unlawful behavior has waned. As the indictments continue to mount
(as of spring 2010), some of which have dubious credibility and appear politically
motivated, and the Constitutional Court of Turkey has annulled a law that would
allow military personnel to be tried in civilian courts, previously existing optimism
regarding the developments of the cases has notably plunged.
As the indictments are ongoing and a lot of the information has been kept under
wraps, it would be foolhardy to firmly claim veracity of certain accusations, espe-
cially in regard to the more recent events. However, as time passes, there seems to
be increasing evidence to support the earlier intended interventions corresponding to
the diaries attributed to former Admiral Örnek.67 In addressing the indictments, this
article largely draws conclusions from the general structure and pattern of assump-
tions that have been established in regard to the “events.” The assumptions them-
selves, whether grounded in substance or not, show a change in the general
mentality of what attempting an intervention in today’s context would entail; the
pattern of interaction (even by would-be plotters) seems to conform to the new
realities opened up by the existence of citizens as consumers.
Distinct from the assumptions made by Aydemir and other plotters in the 1960s,
those with a mind to intervene (whether by coup or by softer means such as exhib-
ited in 1997) assume the need to mobilize support from the media and civil society.
Whereas Talat Aydemir, for example, intended to keep the public out of the plot-
ting, all accounts of the more recent alleged attempted interventions assume as foun-
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example, include not only current and former members of the military but also civic
and business leaders and members of the press.68 There is an understanding that the
military would need to work in tandem with society to meet their aim—drastically
different from the earlier interventions. As for the attempts that were to have taken
place in 2004, which were supposedly more relegated to the military and within the
hierarchy of command, Walter Posch notes that “the generals met with several busi-
ness leaders from the media, among them Aydın Do[gbrev] an, head of the Do[gbrev] an group,
Turkey’s biggest media empire.”69 This would presumably be in order to mobilize
support and consent for potential actions. According to the notorious dairy from the
period, the force commanders discussed a plan that included winning over the press,
and then encouraging university rectors to “pour their students out into the
streets.”70
Furthermore, one of the generals taken into custody who has become a primary
suspect, [Scedil] ener Eruygur, immediately upon retirement from the military became the
president of a civil society organization, the Society for Atatürkist Thought
(Atatürkçü Dü[scedil] ünce Derne[gbrev] i, ADD) and mobilized mass demonstrations in defense
of secularism and to prevent the AKP from occupying the seat of the president.71
These are the behaviors of actors engaged in a competitive environment where
people are able to make choices and, through ubiquitous and privately-controlled
media, decide for themselves what to accept. Although the group intended to oper-
ate in secrecy, it no longer could do so merely within the confines of the barracks
but had to make linkages to civil society and the non-political elite. Such actions
strongly confirm the pattern of behavior that has arisen in the context of crisis and
consideration of intervention witnessed in 1997.
Conclusion
What does this change in civil-military-media interaction portend for the future?
Has the “blurring of the lines” been a positive or negative development? A number
of scholars have viewed the military’s increased utilization of the media outside the
intervention context with a critical eye. For example, Michaud-Emin refers to the
Armed Forces’ “arsenal of unofficial influence” that enables it to retain societal
power despite recent developments and legislation that have curbed their official
channels of power. High on her list of such unofficial means, she places “public
pronouncements,” “media briefings,” and “public ceremonies.”72 Cizre also argues
that within this new context the military is retaining its power, utilizing the media to
“make oral statements,” “write written declarations,” and “reiterate their positions,”
maintaining effective control and support through the utilization of security threats
and a national security discourse.73 In the years closing the first decade of the
twenty-first century, the European Union has regularly commented on this behavior
by the military. In its most recent progress report for Turkey it writes: 
The armed forces have continued to exercise significant political influence via
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expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond
their remit, including on Cyprus, the South East, secularism, political parties
and other non-military developments.74
Generally, there seems to be concern that the military is exerting its force not it
conventional ways but by entering into the political sphere as an interested party and
by using its high level of public support to put pressure on politicians to listen to its
views.
At the same time, however, though the military has often utilized the new condi-
tions effectively to act as a pressure group on day-to-day political activities, this
new environment has come with a number of constraints. The ubiquitous nature of
commercialized media has created a level of oversight that increases the difficulty
and need for legitimization of their behaviors. Commercialized and free media also
means that there is an increasing awareness of what is happening outside the country
as well as an increased ability to be observed by outside groups, including the EU,
the United States, and others. Ever-present media certainly restricts and creates a
measure of oversight for any party significant enough to warrant its attention. In a
context such as this it would take an extreme situation lending a phenomenal
amount of legitimization for the Armed Forces to intervene as they did in the earlier
cases.
With today’s level of global connectedness through increasing powerful media
channels, extreme actions by the military would lead to significant economic and
political losses for Turkey and the military as an institution. Gerassimos Karabelias
argues: “The independent financial power of the military institution increased at
such a pace during the 1990s that it could not afford to retain a stance of being above
politics and economics.”75 Perhaps it is true that the military, along with everyone
else in Turkey, has a vested interest in the day-to-day politics within the country, but
such realities lead to increasingly moderated behaviors, even if those moderated
behaviors become more frequent.
If the behaviors of the top brass in recent months are any indication of the days to
come, it seems that the military’s desire to maintain the trust and support of the
masses has been to stay within democratic expectations as much as possible. The
decision of the General Staff to allow the civilian courts to do their work and quietly
consent to former officers being exposed to investigation appears to be a positive
step forward toward further civilian control over the military. This silence by the
military has certainly been one that is voluntary and not forced upon them.76
Perhaps they are internalizing the perspective of former Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök,
who said in December 2008: 
They have accused me of not being like those involved in February 28 and for
being silent … but I acted under the conclusion that all the nation’s dynamics
and duties to be accomplished should be carried out by those specifically
entrusted to carry them out. I completely believed in democracy’s virtue and
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The silence of the military as Turkey marches forward in its path toward a more
liberal democracy would be a significant development. That there will be further
challenges on this path is clear; one such obstacle is the benefit the media organs
themselves receive from the sensationalism that comes from the military speaking
out through their channels and so have a vested interest in keeping soldiers in
politics.78 The public also seems content to have its most trusted and praiseworthy
institution close by and is genuinely interested in its perspective.79 Furthermore, due
to the nature of the chain of command, with every new Chief of Staff, the military
takes on a slightly different approach and personality. At the same time, however, as
Ersel Aydınlı has pointed out, “The Turkish military leadership, both conservative
and progressive, now faces the challenge of redesigning its relationship with society
under the latter’s terms and expectations—and not their own.”80 This, along with the
current developments and the new environment, give reasons for optimism about
the future.
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